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The organization of foreign policy mechanisms will determine the types of 
policies a President can create. Presidents organize their administrations using a 
formalistic, collegial or competitive approach. In order to mange foreign policy a 
President must develop a balance between formalistic and collegial approaches. This 
thesis analyzes how the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations structured their 
national security organizations and examines their policy decisions towards the Vietnam 
crisis. Eisenhower used a formalistic approach to create a highly structured organization 
with defined procedures to review foreign policy issues. Kennedy's style was far less 
rigid and relied on a high degree of personal interaction and group problem solving. This 
thesis demonstrates that there was a direct relation between the manner in which the US 
foreign policy apparatus was structured and the decisions that were made to escalate US 
involvement in the Vietnam War. This thesis concludes that the formalistic and collegial 
approaches are complimentary and that a President should utilize a combination of both 
approaches. 
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Each President structures his foreign policy organization to suit his own 
leadership and management style. Re-organizing the executive branch is the prerogative of 
the President but he must consider that certain organizational approaches are more 
conducive to managing foreign policy than others. A formalists approach utilizes a 
hierarchical structure and formal procedures in order to rigorously analyze a particular 
issue. Such a structure is most analogous to a staff system and can create policy 
statements based upon thoroughly researched facts and critical analysis. The results can 
then be presented to the President for his approval at formal meetings.  This approach 
can also be used to coordinate and integrate policy among the major governmental agencies 
that deal with foreign policy. The major drawback to this approach however is that it can 
possibly screen vital information from the decision maker and is very inflexible in 
responding to immediate crises because of the lead times required to collect information 
and conduct analysis. The collegial approach utilizes the ability of the decision maker to 
manage the personalities of his advisors and direct the energies of the group towards a 
policy solution.   This approach has the advantage of being able to respond to the 
immediate needs of foreign policy.   The danger to using this approach is that it can lead 
to instituting ad hoc, temporary solutions to foreign policy problems rather than 
addressing root causes of the problem and planning for the long term. 
The major changes in the US national security organization between the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations was a significant contributing factor to 
American involvement in Vietnam. Dwight D. Eisenhower generally utilized a formalistic 
approach to managing foreign policy. He established a strong National Security Council 
ix 
to deal with long term foreign policy issues and had a strong Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles to deal with immediate problems and crises. Eisenhower faced the Vietnam 
problem directly and was able to develop a solution to prevent further Communist gains 
in Southeast Asia. After John F. Kennedy became President he radically altered the US 
foreign policy apparatus. Kennedy did not care for formalized structures and dismantled 
the NCS created by Eisenhower; he relied more upon his close advisors rather than on the 
established governmental officials when making foreign policy. Kennedy did not directly 
confront the Vietnam problem and instead applied temporary fixes as an alternative to 
establishing a stable government in South Vietnam. This policy eventually led to deeper 
American involvement in Vietnam and the escalation of the war. 
The Vietnam crisis illustrates that the structure of an organization has a definite 
impact upon the types of policies that can be created. The best approach to organizing 
for foreign policy is a combination of both the collegial and formalistic approach. The 
formalistic structure should be modeled along the line of Eisenhower's NSC and would be 
used to systematically analyze foreign policy issues and develop policy options. This 
organization would support a collegial mechanism modeled along the Eisenhower/Dulles 
relationship or the Kennedy circle of close advisors and be composed of the President's 
primar>' foreign policy advisors. 
I.INTRODUCTION 
The structure of an organization will determine the 
types of polices it can create. Each President re-organizes 
the national security apparatus to suit his style. In Robert 
Johnson's work Managing the White House, he develops three 
methods which are utilized by Presidents to manage their 
Administrations: the formalistic, competitive and collegial 
approaches.1 In order to manage foreign policy, a President 
must develop a balance among these approaches realizing the 
strengths and weaknesses each offers. 
The formalistic approach relies on an orderly analysis 
of the issues in order to make the best decision. This system 
uses hierarchical structures and orderly processes in order 
to formulate policy. The formalistic system strives to 
minimize conflict among its members. The emphasis is "on 
finding the best solution to national problems rather than 
working out   'compromise  settlements'   on conflicting views."2 
Richard Tanner Johnson,  Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of 
the Presidency,   (New York:   Harper & Row,   Publishers,   1974),   5-8.     It 
must be noted that Johnson's work has been harshly criticized for its 
poor writing style and weak analysis.     This does  not mean that the basic 
framework of the three approaches  is  invalid.     The model still remains a 
legitimate point of departure for analyzing how Presidents organize 
their administrations.     Alexander L.  George has used the framework in 
his book Presidential Decision making in Foreign Policy:  The Effective 
Use of information and Advice as the basis  for further analysis  into 
Presidential decision making. 
2Ibid.,   3. 
This approach lends itself to a staff system where formal 
procedures are established to formulate and develop policy. 
An issue can be analyzed and debated at the lowest levels 
where the staff would work out any conflicting views. The 
agreed solution would then be forwarded to the decision maker 
for his approval. A major advantage of this approach is that 
it seeks the optimal solution and does not place a huge time 
requirement on the part of the decision maker. The 
disadvantages are that information may become distorted as it 
goes through the evaluation process and leaves the decision 
maker with an incorrect picture of the world, and such a 
system is not flexible enough to respond to crisis 
situations. 
The competitive approach depends upon free expression of 
views and thrives on conflict among subordinates. This system 
is the polar opposite of the formalistic approach and 
stresses conflict among subordinates in order to find 
solutions.3 President Franklin D. Roosevelt used this approach 
with his administration and chose to rely on close advisors 
rather than governmental agencies to conduct the business of 
foreign policy. The major drawback to this approach is that 
it can lead to situations where subordinates will withhold 
vital information from the decision maker because of 
competitive pressures.  This approach requires a leader of 
3lbid., 6. 
FDR's political skill to manage and would be less conducive 
to dealing with the issues of modern foreign policy where 
quick and timely information is critical to the decision 
making process. Given the modern day environment where 
information is exchanged quickly, the application of the 
competitive approach could be more costly than any potential 
benefits that might be gained. 
Finally, the collegial approach relies on the decision 
maker's ability to manage conflict among subordinates and 
direct the efforts of the foreign policy team towards 
achieving a solution. This system strives to find a balance 
between the formalistic and the competitive; it tries to 
utilize the best characteristics of each and applies them to 
achieve the best decisions. This approach requires more 
involvement from the decision maker and may lead to "group 
think" rather than achieving substantive policy decisions. 
Given these three approaches, is any one of them better or 
more conducive to managing foreign affairs? 
Johnson suggests that a President must seek a middle 
ground between the formalistic approach and the competitive 
approaches, which means that he should pursue a collegial 
approach.4 The costs of the competitive approach are 
prohibitively high and require an exceptional person to 
practically apply it to US foreign policy making.  A better 
4ibid., 7. 
choice is to develop a style that lies somewhere in the 
middle ground between the formalistic and collegial 
approaches. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how previous 
Presidents, specifically the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
Administrations, organized their foreign policy apparatus and 
to draw conclusions as to the most effective organizational 
approach. Eisenhower used a formalistic approach to create a 
highly structured organization with defined procedures to 
review foreign policy issues.5 Kennedy's style was far less 
rigid and relied on a high degree of personal interaction and 
group problem solving.6 
This thesis will first analyze the foreign policy 
machinery of each Administration in terms of these 
approaches. Next, it will examine the performance of each 
respective Administration towards Vietnam and evaluate the 
effectiveness of the approach. This work examines US 
involvement in Vietnam and argues this particular crisis 
slowly dragged America into a war partly as a result of a 
break down in the American foreign policy apparatus. This 
work will show that there was a direct relationship with the 
manner in which the US became involved in Vietnam and the 
foreign policy mechanisms that existed at the time. 
5Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: 
The Effective Use of Information and Advice, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1980), 152-154. 
6Ibid., 157-158. 
The criteria used to determine the effectiveness of each 
approach include (1) the degree to which the decision-making 
machinery screens and distorts information; (2) the extent to 
which the decision maker is exposed to both substantive and 
interpersonal conflict; (3) the overall responsiveness of the 
decision process; and (4) the thoroughness with which 
alternatives are staffed out and decisions are weighed.7 
This thesis is divided into three sections. The first 
and second sections examine the Eisenhower and the Kennedy 
Administrations respectively and analyze the effects of their 
approach in dealing with the Vietnam problem. The third 
section examines the trade-offs between each approach in the 
previous sections, covers lessons learned for future 
Administrations and makes recommendations which may help 
avoid pitfalls. 
Organization of the foreign policy mechanisms are 
important because they can significantly impact on how policy 
choices are made. Foreign policy is too complex to be 
handled by a single person or on an ad hoc basis; this can 
lead to reactionary policies which in turn can lead to 
disastrous consequences. The process of making foreign policy 
is complex because it involves collecting information, 
analyzing sometimes conflicting information to understand 
what it means, deciding on a course of action and executing 
7Johnson, Managing the White House,   237, 
this action. This is an iterative and ongoing process which 
suggests that a mechanism is required to review issues and 
problems systematically. Today a President cannot afford to 
totally re-invent the wheel and must accept some established 
formal mechanisms to provide a focus for issues. There 
simply is not enough time for a newly inaugurated President 
to get off top dead center and "learn" to be a foreign policy 
leader. 
Every Administration has difficulty making purposeful 
and coherent foreign policy and there is no cook book 
solution to the problem. The end of the Cold War has made the 
world a more dangerous place and the crafting of foreign 
policy even more challenging. Making foreign policy decisions 
will not become any simpler. Utilizing a particular 
organizational approach to manage foreign affairs will not 
necessarily lead to a "correct" solution or even a favorable 
resolution to a crisis. But what these approaches do provide 
is a choice of systematic and manageable methods to foreign 
policy rather than reactive and haphazard alternatives. 
Examining the manner in which previous President's have 
organized their foreign policy mechanisms to deal with 
foreign policy dilemmas could provide insights on how to deal 
with present day problems. 
II.THE    EISENHOWER    FOREIGN    POLICY    ORGANIZATION 
Richard Johnson has characterized the Eisenhower 
Administration as an example of the formalistic approach 
because of its orientation towards orderly and systematic 
processes. Eisenhower did create a more structured 
administration than any of his predecessors. He used his 
experience as a career army staff officer to create an 
organization that was able to face the foreign policy 
problems of the early Cold War era. Critics have charged 
that there was too much organization in the Eisenhower 
Administration which projected the impression that Eisenhower 
was indecisive and not executing his duties as President. A 
closer examination of the Eisenhower foreign policy machinery 
will reveal that this was not the case and that Eisenhower 
used both formal and informal means to manage foreign policy.8 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower created several 
mechanisms to manage foreign policy.9 First, he established a 
strong National  Security  Council with   formal  procedures   and 
8Fred I.  Greenstein,   The Hidden-Hand Presidency (New York:  Basic Books, 
Inc.  Publishers,   1982),   101. 
9I.M.  Destler,   Our Own Worst Enemy:  The Unmaking of American Foreign 
Policy,   (Simon and Shuster,   1984),   175. 
defined areas of responsibility. Second, he created the Staff 
Secretary position to help keep track of national security 
issues for the White House. Finally, Eisenhower selected John 
Foster Dulles to be Secretary of State and granted him great 
latitude in which to conduct foreign policy. These three 
mechanisms allowed Eisenhower to deal with the multitude of 
foreign policy dilemmas he faced. 
A.EISENHOWER'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
During the 1952 campaign Eisenhower accused President 
Truman for not using the National Security Council to its 
fullest potential and promised to revitalize the national 
security apparatus.10 Truman underutilized the Council because 
he felt that the NSC impinged upon his Presidential 
prerogatives. The NSC was legislated by Congress as part of 
the National Security Act of 1947 in order to better 
coordinate US political-military affairs. Truman believed 
that the President should not be dictated to as to whom he 
should consult with in the area of foreign matters. Rather 
than legitimize the NSC, Truman literally stayed away and 
rarely attended the initial meetings of the Council. Truman 
used the Council "only as a place for recommendations to be 
worked out...the policy itself has to come down from the 
10Ibid., 172. 
President, as all final decisions have to be made by him."11 
Only after the outbreak of the Korean War did Truman 
regularly attend Council meetings; but even then the overall 
contribution of the NSC to foreign policy was limited to the 
creation of position papers rather than substantive foreign 
policy guidance. 
Eisenhower did not have to deal with the problems Truman 
faced in terms of challenges the NSC posed to Presidential 
power. By the time Eisenhower took office the NSC had 
existed for five years and proven itself a useful tool for 
staff work. Eisenhower asked Robert Cutler, a Boston banker 
and lawyer who wrote speeches for the President during the 
campaign, to develop a plan to re-organize the Council. 
Cutler's recommendations became the basis for transforming 
the National Security Council. 
In his report Cutler raised several important points 
about the operation and organization of the NSC. He 
emphasized the need to focus on national security issues; 
specifically to "integrate the manifold aspects of national 
security policy (such as foreign, military, economic, fiscal, 
internal security, psychological) to the end that security 
policies finally recommended to the President shall be both 
represented and fused, rather than compartmentalized and 
i:LHarry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S.   Truman: years of Trail and Hope 
Vol.Two,   (New York: Doubleday & Company INC., 1956), 59. 
several."12 Cutler also stressed the advisory nature of the 
Council; the NSC under Eisenhower would have limited 
responsibility for overseeing implementation of Council 
decisions and no operational capabilities. Another concern 
was the actual process of policy formulation; in order 
produce realistic and intelligent policy there had to be a 
thorough analysis of the issue where all alternatives were 
critically examined. This required developing a process that 
balanced between "obtaining the advice of all who have some 
responsibility for the subject matter under consideration 
and...restricting attendance to that level which would permit 
intimate, frank and fruitful discussion."13 Ultimately, each 
of these recommendations was geared towards developing the 
best option and minimizing conflict among Council and Staff 
members. Eisenhower approved the recommendations in the 
Cutler Report. Once implemented these changes transformed the 
NSC from a simple policy coordinating organization into a 
complex highly structured institution with clearly delineated 
responsibilities and procedures that guided its operation. 
Three major changes occurred to the NSC structure. The 
first change was in the Council membership. During the 
Eisenhower Administration membership on the Council was 
12Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council" in 
Decisions of the Highest Order,   56.  Originally appeared in Foreign 
Affairs, 34 (1956), 441-458. 
13James Lay and Robert Johnson, Organizational History of the National 
Security Council,   1960, 23. 
10 
expanded to included the President, Vice-President, 
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Office 
of Mobilization, the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Director of the Budget.14 The Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
served as advisors to the Council; other department heads 
would attend as required or as the President directed. In the 
absence of the President, the Vice President would chair the 
meeting rather than the Secretary of State as was done in the 
Truman Administration. Overall attendance at NSC meeting grew 
to over fifteen participants and observers.15 
The second important change was the creation of the 
Special Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs. The Special Assistant was similar to Truman's 
Executive Secretary but with far greater power. Besides 
serving as the Executive Officer of the Council, Eisenhower's 
Special Assistant chaired both major NSC staff agencies 
(Planning Board and Operations Coordination Board), was 
responsible for determining the Council's agenda, personally 
briefed the President on security issues, focused arguments 
during the planning stages and monitored the implementation 
of policy. 
14Cutler,   "Development of the NSC",   61. 
15Ibid.f   61. 
11 
Over the years the National Security Adviser grew in 
power and prominence rivalling the Secretary of State. This 
was not the case with the early NSC. During the Truman 
Administration Admiral Sidney Souers served as the Executive 
Secretary and described the role of the Secretary as "an 
anonymous servant of the Council"16 who must "be the political 
confidant of the President, and willing to subordinate his 
personal views on policy to his task of coordinating the 
views of responsible officials."17 Robert Cutler, who served 
as Eisenhower's first Special Assistant, energized the 
position with a new vigor but for the most part maintained 
the low-profile example set by Sid Souers. 
The final change occurred in the organization of the NSC 
staff. The staff consisted of a Planning Board and an 
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). The Assistant for 
Planning from each agency represented on the Council was a 
member of the Planning Board. Each member of the Planning 
Board had "a presidential commission entitling him to any 
information he might want from his department."18 Under the 
supervision of the Special Assistant, the Planning Board 
carefully staffed out policy papers. 
16Sidney W.   Souers,   "Policy Formulation  for National  Security"   in 
Decision of the Highest Order,   Inderfurth and Johnson,  eds.,50. 
Originally appeared  in American Political  Service Review,   43   (June 
1949),   534-543. 
17Ibid.,   50.   Italics  added. 
18Greenstein,   The Hidden-Hand Presidency,   126. 
12 
In order to provide the National Security Council with 
as complete a picture as possible on security issues, the 
Planning Board developed an exhaustive analysis process. Any 
part of the Council could bring up issues for Planning Board 
consideration. Items for review were scheduled well in 
advance so that Board members had sufficient time to prepare. 
Prior to drafting an initial policy statement on a particular 
issue, the Board required several meetings in order to 
collect basic information and intelligence estimates upon 
which to write the draft statement. Once this information was 
collected, a work group would write a draft policy statement. 
These drafts had a specific format that included general 
objectives, policy guidance and financial estimates. From 
these drafts the Planning Board would begin the task of 
serious examination and revision in order to focus the paper 
into a policy recommendation. Disagreements were noted and 
sent to the Council as "split" papers detailing the differing 
views. The final policy paper was sent to Council members 
several days in advance of the meeting at which it was to be 
addressed. 
After the approval of a paper, the Operations 
Coordination Board took over and directed the cognizant 
governmental department to implement the Council's decisions. 
Generally, the OCB formulated a plan to operationalize the 
policy and then coordinated between agencies to ensure 
implementation was carried out. The OCB did not have the 
13 
authority to order the various agencies to carry out the 
Council's decisions; it was in no way an operational entity. 
Rather, the OCB only monitored and reported on the progress 
of implementation. 
The NSC's entire process of policy formulation and 
implementation was described by Robert Cutler as "policy 
hill." At the bottom of the hill the Planning Board would 
systematically analyze an issue and develop a policy paper on 
the subject. These formal papers then went up to the Council 
membership and were formally presented at the weekly Thursday 
meeting. After the issue was presented and all points 
actively argued, the President, at the summit of the hill, 
would make the final decision on the paper. Once the 
President approved the policy paper, it became official US 
policy and would go back down to the cognizant department for 
implementation. The OCB would then coordinate and monitor 
the implementation of the policy. 
Eisenhower's National Security Council was the 
quintessential formalistic mechanism; it operated with lock- 
step precision examining, arguing, revising and refining an 
issue in order to distill the optimal policy. The NSC served 
as the forum in which to examine long range foreign policy 
problems and develop US responses. This system limited 
conflict among its members; it did stress the importance of 
fully expressing differences on a particular issue but 
achieved a resolution by either deciding among Planning Board 
14 
members or from the President making a final decision 
himself. As a device for integrating and coordinating 
foreign policy, Eisenhower's NSC had fulfilled the 
President's campaign promise of restoring the organization 
into a vital part of the foreign policy apparatus. Finally, 
the biggest advantage this system provided was to conserve 
the time of the decision maker. By the time an issue had 
reached the Council, it had been rigorously researched so 
that the Council could concentrate on the central issue 
rather than trying to examine the details. 
This system did have shortcomings that prevented it from 
becoming the only means to conduct foreign policy making. 
Eisenhower was never really satisfied with the OCB operation; 
he expected that once an issue was decided upon that it would 
be carried out, not returned to the Council. The OCB portion 
of the Council was weak because it had no authority to 
enforce implementation and then problems would simply fall 
back into the Council. Further, because of its size and lead- 
time requirements, the NSC was unable to respond to crisis 
situations. For day-to-day problems Eisenhower relied on 
other structures to help manage foreign policy. 
B. THE STAFF SECRETARY 
The position of Staff Secretary was created because of 
a mix-up in paper work: "someone had done something unaware 
15 
that another line of activity had begun."19 In order to 
ensure such mistakes would not happen again, Eisenhower 
applied a practice used during his Army service, ordering the 
Staff Secretary into existence. General Paul T. Carroll, 
Eisenhower's national security and intelligence liaison, 
served as the first Staff Secretary. After Carroll's sudden 
death he was succeeded by General Andrew Goodpaster. This is 
significant because Goodpaster assumed Carroll's duties which 
included assisting Chief of Staff Sherman Adams manage daily 
national security issues and monitoring secret cables to the 
President. From these inherited responsibilities the Staff 
Secretary role was able to do the things Eisenhower wanted 
done outside the NSC system. 
At first the Staff Secretary was simply a paperwork 
coordinator who managed all defense related documents that 
went before the President. But the position grew in 
importance and responsibilities as the President directed 
"sensitive business through the staff secretary rather than 
the NSC or his special assistant."20 After the regular NSC 
meeting Eisenhower held an informal gathering of the main 
policy makers.21 At these meetings Goodpaster would write 
summaries of the discussion and like Robert Cutler "saw that 
19ibid., 142. 
20John Prados, Keepers of the Keys:  A History of the NSC from Truman  to 
Bush   (New York: William Morrow and Company, INC., 1991), 65. 
21 Greenstein, Hidden Hand,   134, 
16 
critical participants were not frozen out of discussion and 
that Eisenhower's decisions were carried out."22 Goodpaster 
also managed communications and information that went 
directly to the President. Eventually Goodpaster gained the 
trust of Secretary of State Dulles and was occasionally asked 
to sit in on meetings between the Secretary and the 
President; this became standard procedure with Dulles's 
successor Christian Herter. During the Taiwan Strait crisis 
Eisenhower sent Goodpaster to obtain an estimate of the 
situation from CINCPAC Admiral Felix Stump in Pearl Harbor. 
Goodpaster's visit drew less attention than calling the 
Admiral to Washington.23 Finally, Goodpaster supervised the 
U-2 reconnaissance missions which included the May 1960 shoot 
down of Francis Gary Powers. 
While the NSC served the formal staffing function, the 
Staff Secretary was able to provide immediate responsiveness 
to the President's daily foreign policy requirements. The 
Staff Secretary served as another source of information that 
Eisenhower could use in order to develop his policy position: 
"on a host of questions, the staff secretary actively sought 
out knowledge the President desired, represented Eisenhower's 
views to others, and brought problems back to the President 
based on his own observations."24   The Staff Secretary 
22Ibid.,134. 
23Prados,   Keepers of the Keys  ,   67. 
17 
provided flexibility but was in no position to handle the 
bulk of US foreign policy. By Goodpaster's ranking of 
Eisenhower's foreign policy hierarchy, the Secretary of State 
was the primary advisor, followed by the National Security 
Advisor and finally the Staff Secretary.25 
C.SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES 
The single most important foreign policy mechanism was 
the way Eisenhower utilized his Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles. Eisenhower entrusted the conduct of foreign 
policy to Dulles; he served as the point man and was a 
dominant force in shaping US foreign policy. Dulles worked 
tirelessly to protect US interests and frequently traveled 
overseas as the President's envoy. Because of Dulles's 
dominance the popular view of the relationship between 
Eisenhower and Dulles was that the Secretary dictated US 
foreign policy and that the President simply deferred to the 
Secretary. The impression portrayed to the public, and 
exploited by political opponents, was that Eisenhower was an 
absentee President who allowed his Cabinet members to wield 
the true power. Although Eisenhower granted Secretary Dulles 




decision on foreign policy matters. There were two major 
factors that re-enforce Eisenhower's absentee image and must 
be examined in order to understand the manner in which he 
utilized Dulles to manage foreign affairs. 
The first factor was the outward appearance projected 
to the public. There were organizational procedures and 
actions taken by the administration which seemingly isolated 
the President from real problems. The apparent dominance of 
Chief of Staff Sherman Adams in approving matters before 
going to the President and Eisenhower's insistence that 
problems should be settled at the lowest levels were both 
criticized for serving as filters for screening out possibly 
critical information. Sherman Adams's role as the "omnipotent 
palace guardian"26 has been overstated since Adams simply 
carried out the expected duties of a chief of staff. The 
practice of resolving problems at the lowest level was 
translated by critics as avoiding substantive problems. 
Eisenhower did not evade making the major decisions; but he 
believed that minor problems be handled below the 
Presidential level and that only the major issues should 
reach the President. Eisenhower's performance at press 
conferences, where he sometimes referred questions to 
Secretary Dulles rather than answer himself, added to the 
sense of Presidential remoteness. This was unfortunate timing 
26 Greenstein, Hidden Hand,   147. 
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since the President usually met with the press on days after 
Dulles had his news conferences. Therefore it appeared that 
Eisenhower simply repeated, with a slight variation, what the 
Secretary had stated the day before. Eisenhower was weary of 
the press and chose to be guarded and evasive rather than 
provide a glib answer that possibly could be detrimental in 
the long term.27 
The second major factor contributing to Eisenhower's 
apparent Presidential absenteeism was his delegation of 
authority to his subordinates. The President relied upon his 
Cabinet members to take charge and run their respective 
departments. Eisenhower once berated Defense Secretary 
Charles Wilson for trying to get the President's advice on 
how to deal with an internal operation problem in the Defense 
Department.28 Eisenhower provided guidelines to his Cabinet 
members and would allow them to execute policy as they saw 
fit. This same standard was applied to foreign affairs where 
Eisenhower expected Dulles to develop "specific policy, 
including the decision where the administration would stand 
and what course of action would be followed in each 
international crisis."29 
27Stephen Hess,   Organizing the Presidency,   (Washington D.C.:  The 
Brookings   Institute,   1988),   67. 
28Johnson,  Managing the White House,   84. 
29Sherman Adams,   Firsthand Report,   87  in Powers of the President in 
Foreign Affairs,   Edgar E.   Robinson,   (San Francisco:   Commonwealth Club of 
California,   1966),   95. 
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Among all his Cabinet members President Eisenhower 
developed the closest working relationship with Secretary 
Dulles. There was a sense of trust and mutual respect between 
these men. Dulles had immediate access to Eisenhower and "was 
the only Cabinet member who could speak with the President at 
the White House without a witness being present."30 Dulles 
always kept the President informed: "The two men were in 
daily touch even when Dulles was out of the country...if they 
could not talk by telephone because Dulles was overseas, they 
exchanged coded cables."31 Further, Eisenhower relieved Dulles 
of administrative responsibilities usually associated with 
the Secretary of State in order that Dulles could concentrate 
on managing foreign policy.32 The President knew Dulles's 
strengths and weaknesses and used the Secretary to his best 
potential. Eisenhower wrote of Dulles: 
I still think of him, as I always have, as an 
intensive student of foreign affairs. He is well- 
informed and, in this subject at least, is 
deserving, I think, of his reputation as a "wise" 
man...he believes in the United States, in the 
dignity of man, and in moral values...he is not 
particularly persuasive in presentation and, at 
times seems to have a curious lack of understanding 
as to how his words and manner may affect another 
personality...my only doubts concerning him lie in 
the field of personality, not in his capacity as a 
student of foreign affairs.33 
30
Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez, (Chicago:Quadrangle Books, 1964), 73. 
31Greenstein, Hidden Hand,   87. 
32Ibid., 142. 
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The individual freedom in which to operate, granted not 
only to Dulles but to all Cabinet secretaries, drew the 
criticism that Eisenhower had abdicated his Presidency. Such 
criticism does not take into account that the President 
cannot possibly manage and know the detailed operations of 
each department; any President who tries to run the various 
departments from the White House will only get bogged down in 
minute details and ultimately accomplish nothing. The 
operation of the executive branch, especially in the area of 
foreign policy, is too complex a process for a single person 
to contend with. There are dangers to allowing the Secretary 
too much autonomy. The Secretary could misrepresent the 
President's position which could lead to a greater crisis. 
Relying solely on information from the Secretary could screen 
out vital information. These drawbacks need to be recognized 
and measures taken to counter potential effects on the 
decision making process. Critics aside, Eisenhower gave 
Dulles great latitude in which to act but always retained the 
final decision on all matters; the President delegated his 
authority, not his constitutional responsibilities. 
The major effect of having a strong Secretary of State 
was that it drew political criticism away from the President: 
"Dulles was the only postwar Secretary of State who 
33Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Diaries,   Robert H. Ferrel, ed. 
(New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1981), 237. 
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consistently took a harder foreign-policy line than the 
President he served"34 The Secretary would draw the serious 
criticism while the President remained popular. Furthermore, 
it relieved the President of having to directly manage his 
foreign policy. Eisenhower depended upon Secretary Dulles to 
manage foreign affairs in accordance with his guidelines 
while the President managed the bigger picture of both 
foreign ^and domestic concerns. 
Overall the Eisenhower Administration was certainly 
systematic in its approach to foreign affairs, but it was not 
a rigidly cold and calculating machine. The organization 
tended towards a formalistic approach but also used other 
mechanisms that could respond to immediate problems. The 
reorganized NSC provided a means for long term planning, 
allowed the major government agencies to better integrate 
their actions, and created a body of policy guidance in which 
to operate. The NSC was not useful for quick response to 
crisis situations, but there were other devices that could be 
used, and in many cases problems were handled outside the NSC 
system. General Goodpaster's role as Staff Secretary allowed 
Eisenhower an alternative method to handle sensitive matters 
discretely and provided another source of information. But 
by far the primary mechanism for managing foreign affairs was 
the manner in which Eisenhower utilized Secretary of State 
34Destler, Own Worst Enemy,   174. 
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Dulles to deal directly with the major foreign policy 
dilemmas. The NSC provided a systematic means by which 
seriously analyze issues while the Staff Secretary and the 
Secretary of State provided flexibility. We can now examine 
the organization in action by analyzing how Eisenhower 
managed the Indochina Crisis of 1954. 
D.THE INDOCHINA CRISIS 1954 
President Eisenhower viewed Asia as a region vital to US 
national security. The possibility existed that if Vietnam 
fell under Communist control that the rest of Southeast Asia 
would also turn Communist. In his 1952 campaign Eisenhower 
had criticized Truman for the loss of China in 1948 and in 
1953 his Administration had just ended the Korean War. The US 
was already committed to France's efforts in Indochina; from 
1950 to 1954 America provided the French $1.2 billion to 
fight the war.35 France's imminent defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 
May of 1954 created a difficult foreign policy dilemma for 
Eisenhower; he had to decide if America should intervene to 
prevent the fall of the French and risk embroiling the US in 
a lost cause or allow the Communists to achieve gains in 
Southeast Asia. 
35Walter LaFeber, America,   Russia  and the Cold War 1945-1990,   (New York: 
McGraw Hill Inc., 1991), 161. 
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US action in the 1954 Indochina Crisis to block further 
Communist expansion occurred in two phases. In the first 
phase Eisenhower had to determine if the US should intervene 
and relieve the siege. In the second phase the US slowly 
assumed the French role and tried to cut any further losses 
by supporting the Diem government in South Vietnam against Ho 
Chi Minn's government in the North. The formalistic aspects 
of the Eisenhower Administration provided very little in 
terms of immediate response to the crisis. Rather, it was 
Eisenhower's extensive use of Secretary Dulles both to garner 
support for American intervention during the Dien Bien Phu 
phase and to represent US interests at the subsequent Geneva 
Conference that resolved the crisis. 
Each of the parties involved in the Indochina Crisis of 
1954 were pursuing different interests. The Viet Minh were 
fighting for their independence. France was trying to 
reestablish its colonial presence. The Chinese and Soviets 
had an opportunity to prevent American influence in the 
region. The US wanted to prevent the further expansion of 
Communism. Only the Americans viewed the Indochina Crisis in 
terms of a Communist threat. Thus, the war in Indochina 
became a test of America's Containment Policy in Southeast 
Asia. Eisenhower and Dulles generally pursued a course that 
attempted to prevent further Communist expansion and at the 
same time tried to create a collective security mechanism for 
Southeast Asia. 
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After the Second World War France returned to Indochina 
in hopes of regaining control over its former colony. In 1946 
the French refused to recognize the Ho Chi Minn government 
and started a civil war against the nationalist Viet Minn. 
Because the French did not seriously plan or organize any 
effective government or military force, the war raged on for 
eight years. In 1954 General Navarre arrived to take command 
of the French forces. Under the Navarre Plan the French 
launched a massive offensive and chose to battle the Viet 
Minh in a remote valley at Dien Bien Phu. John Foster Dulles 
was enthusiastic about the plan and stated it would defeat 
the Communists by the end of 1955.36 Unfortunately Navarre 
underestimated the war fighting capabilities of the Viet 
Minh. By the end of March 1954 the French were losing badly 
at Dien Bien Phu, where the Viet Minh had laid siege to the 
French outpost. On March 20 the French Chief of Staff 
General Paul Ely went to Washington to ask for American 
assistance. 
General Ely's request for US military intervention was 
enthusiastically met by his American counterpart, Admiral 
Arthur Radford who offered massive air support to lift the 
siege. The Radford plan, called VULTURE, would conduct night 
air strikes on the Communist positions around Dien Bien Phu 
Robert Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in  the 20th Century,   (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 236. 
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with B-29 bombers and carrier based aircraft. Air Force Chief 
of Staff General Nathan Twining also supported the plan and 
believed that atomic bombs could be used tactically.37 It is 
unclear as to whether Dulles actually advocated the air 
strike plan, let alone the use of atomic weapons. The 
Secretary seemed to favor some sort of international 
intervention.38 Eisenhower considered VULTURE only as a 
possible option but would not commit America without 
Congressional approval and support from the British. 
Eisenhower and Dulles worked to secure support for 
American intervention. Dulles went to Congressional leaders 
on April 3 and asked to get a resolution for US intervention. 
But Congress was cool to the idea when they discovered that 
not all the joint chiefs agreed on the air strike plan. Army 
Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgeway, who commanded UN 
forces in Korea, did not put much faith in the plan and 
opposed any intervention in Indochina.39 Air strikes would not 
be sufficient to achieve a victory and it appeared that a 
massive infusion of ground troops would be necessary. 
Congress indicated that they might approve of US 
intervention if the British also entered the conflict, 
furthermore France had to give up its colonial ambitions and 
37LaFeber, America,  Russia and the Cold War,   164. 
38Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century,   237, 
39LaFeber, America,  Russia and the Cold War,   163. 
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grant Indochina its independence. Eisenhower wrote Prime 
Minister Churchill suggesting that the US and Great Britain 
join together and intervene to save the French.40 On April 20 
Dulles went to London and tried to obtain Churchill's 
approval, but was refused. British Foreign Minister Eden 
believed that any military intervention would only escalate 
the crisis and potentially lead to another world war. The 
British viewed the French war in Indochina as a lost cause 
and not worth diluting their political capital. Without a 
Congressional resolution or British support, Eisenhower 
decided that the US should not risk its national prestige to 
prevent the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Instead the US 
concentrated on influencing the diplomatic effort at the 
upcoming Geneva Conference. 
On May 7 Dien Bien Phu fell to Viet Minh forces. The 
French defeat meant the Viet Minh had the diplomatic 
advantage at the Geneva Conference and could dictate terms to 
the French. This was of great concern to Eisenhower and 
Dulles since the US supported France and feared the French 
would simply surrender all of Indochina to the Communists.41 
The entire crisis placed the US in a foreign policy bind. 
Eisenhower and Dulles did not want to alienate French support 
for European defense nor at the same time to give up more 
40Ibid., 162. 
41Elmo Richardson,The Presidency of Dwight D.  Eisenhower,   (Lawrence: The 
Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), 77. 
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territory to the Communists: "the administration feared that 
the conference might endorse major communist gains...Yet to 
remain aloof would deprive the United States of any means to 
influence the outcome."42 
In order to forestall any unacceptable French 
concessions, the American delegation, led by Secretary 
Dulles, remained purposely indifferent at the talks. This 
tactic projected the impression that the US would intervene 
militarily should the French conclude the talks with an 
agreement unacceptable to the Americans. Dulles's behavior at 
the conference was especially abrasive towards the other 
parties present; in particular the Chinese. At one time the 
Secretary left the conference, instructing the remaining 
delegation to act only as an "interested party" and to agree 
to nothing that compromised the territorial integrity of 
Vietnam.43 Dulles worked tirelessly to obtain support for 
collective action into Indochina by the allies. The US 
planned for possible military intervention with other allies 
in late May. Dulles tried to obtain British support, but 
Foreign Minister Eden would work on an agreement only after 
the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. The Secretary also 
tried to persuade the French to internationalize the war, but 
42George C. Herring, "'A Good Stout Effort'; John Foster Dulles and the 
Indochina Crisis, 1954-1955." in Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold 
War,  Richard Immerman, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990), 219. 
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France and the US could not even agree on terms of any US 
intervention. 
The negotiations in Geneva stalled until a new French 
government under Pierre Mendes-France was elected into power. 
Mendes-France vowed to reach an accord to end the war or 
resign his post by mid-July 1954. Arrival of a new French 
prime minister fundamentally changed the US position. Since 
an agreement was likely to occur, the US could not militarily 
intervene based upon failed negotiations. Instead the US 
pressured the French to seek an agreement that would not 
validate any Communist gains. When the French conceded the 
northern part of the country to Ho Chi Minh, Secretary Dulles 
would not return to the conference."44 Eisenhower ordered 
Dulles to consult with Mendes-France and after hearing the 
Prime Minister's plan, the Secretary gave in on his hard line 
stance. In order to obtain US support for a settlement at 
Geneva, the French, with British assistance, persuaded the 
Americans to accept a "seven-point plan" that allowed the 
non-Communist portions of Indochina to receive military aid 
from foreign governments.45 Dulles seemingly accepted these 
conditions as a basis for an agreement at Geneva. 
On July 21 an armistice was reached between the Viet 




withdrawal of Ho Chi Minh's forces north of the 17th 
parallel, no foreign alliances or foreign military bases in 
Indochina and the conduct of free elections in order to re- 
unify the country. Since the Viet Minh already controlled 
two-thirds of the countryside, Ho had to be pressured by the 
Soviets and Chinese to withdraw to the north. The Communists 
were confident that they could easily achieve victory in any 
election because Ho was the most popular and well known 
nationalist in Vietnam. Naturally, from the American view 
control of North Vietnam under Communism was unacceptable. 
Dulles stated that the US would support free elections only 
if supervised by the United Nations. In reality Dulles knew 
Ho would win any election, assuring expansion into Indochina, 
but the US would not allow this to happen. Conclusion of the 
Geneva Conference brought an end to French influence in the 
region and cleared the way for greater US intervention. 
The results of the Geneva Conference were not totally 
satisfactory to the US because the agreement sanctioned 
Communist gains. Dulles immediately conducted diplomatic 
maneuvers to counter any further Communist expansion. First, 
aid was given directly to the South Vietnamese rather than 
through France. This act meant that the US was now taking 
over the French role in Indochina. Second, the Geneva 
settlement was signed between the Viet Minh and France; the 
US was not a signatory, therefore the US was not bound by 
agreement. This allowed the US to act freely by ignoring the 
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mandate for elections and providing military aid. Third, in 
order to oppose the Ho Chi Minn nationalists, the US brought 
back Ngo Dinh Diem from his self-imposed exile to take over 
as Prime Minister of the South Vietnamese government. The US 
supported Diem and hoped that he could unify the South 
against Ho Chi Minh. Fourth, the US started to train the 
South Vietnamese army into an effective fighting force; 
something the French had failed to do. Finally, Dulles 
constructed the collective security mechanism he had wanted 
the entire time by establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization. Dulles hoped that SEATO would serve as the 
regional organization that might deter the Communists. 
These actions were able to temporarily delay the 
Communists from taking over all of Vietnam. The US continued 
to support Diem even though he had turned the government in 
the South into an oppressive dictatorship. Diem never rallied 
the people to challenge the nationalism of Ho Chi Minh. The 
American-trained South Vietnamese Army overthrew Diem in a 
violent coup in 1963. SEATO never adequately fulfilled the 
role Dulles hoped as a collective security mechanism for 
Southeast Asia. The treaty had no real teeth and did not 
specifically establish Communist expansion as a threat. 
Several key countries that could have acted as the buffer 
against the Communists were unable to join because of the 
1954 Geneva conference. Even among member nations support was 
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weak and the conditions for unified action were defined as 
defense against a general threat to the region. 
In the long run the US, like the French, became 
involved in another costly drawn-out war. Ten years and 
three Administrations later the US would start down the 
slippery slope of Vietnam. The Johnson Administration in 
1964 knew it was battling Communism but lost sight of the 
purpose for involvement in Indochina and its relevance to 
greater US national interests. Dulles's actions from 1954 to 
1955 were temporary measures that required consistent follow- 
up actions by his successors. 
E.EVALUATION OF THE EISENHOWER APPROACH 
In terms of evaluating the effectiveness of the 
Eisenhower foreign policy organization, the system worked 
relatively well. The approach did not screen out critical 
information from the decision maker. The NSC pointed out the 
strategic importance of Indochina to US interests in 1950.46 
The Eisenhower NSC spent the first two years reviewing all 
the Truman NSC papers. In 1953 the NSC again pointed out the 
significance of Indochina as a buffer against Communist 
expansion and that the French must be supported in their 
46Schulzinger, American Diplomacy, 236. 
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effort to battle the Viet Minh.47 The NSC's rigorous analysis 
process provided the decision maker with as much information 
as possible in order to make clear the significance of 
Southeast Asia. But the primary mechanism used in the crisis, 
Secretary Dulles, screened information to a certain extent 
filtered by his own interpretation of events. This occurred 
when the French conceded the northern portion of Vietnam. 
Dulles protested this action by refusing to return to the 
conference; in his view any French concessions jeopardized US 
interests. However Eisenhower did not accept Dulles's view on 
the concession to partition Vietnam and overrode his 
Secretary. As pointed out earlier, the two were in constant 
contact as Dulles kept the President informed. Furthermore, 
the working relationship was such that Dulles and Eisenhower 
were candid in their opinions that any essential information 
was to be passed on to the President. Eisenhower was able to 
make decisions based upon the best possible information. 
Exposure to conflict among the organization's members 
determines if the decision maker is made aware of different 
alternatives. Eisenhower was exposed to conflict through 
security council meetings where he was able to view all sides 
of an issue. But during the crisis the NSC did not make the 
daily decisions. In his meetings with Dulles there was little 
47ibid., 236. 
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conflict. The danger here is that the President could be 
misled into believing a problem does not exist when in fact 
there is a major crisis. This occurred later in 1956 during 
the Suez Crisis when Dulles reported to Eisenhower that the 
situation would not become a major problem or possibly lead 
to war. A degree of conflict between the President and his 
advisors is required in order to consider alternative options 
and avoid group thinking or mutual re-enforcement. 
The Eisenhower foreign policy organization was able to 
respond quickly to the crisis in Indochina. As stated 
previously, the NSC did not have the flexibility to respond 
to crisis situations. But Secretary Dulles was able to 
provide the immediate response and was frequently shuttling 
between the major powers in order to state the US position on 
the matter. This flexibility allowed the US to influence the 
outcome of the crisis. 
Finally, throughout that crisis alternatives were 
staffed out and decisions were carefully made. The staff work 
of the NSC initiated the action taken by Eisenhower; it was 
the NSC's National Security Memorandum that stated the 
importance of Southeast Asia to US national security. A 
possible failure on the part of the NSC lies in not 
continuing to map out American interests in Indochina. A 
constant review of the purposes for involvement in Indochina, 
within the greater strategic context of US interests around 
the world, could have averted the prolonged American 
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engagement during the Vietnam War. The NSC was not involved 
in the planning of possible military intervention during Dien 
Bien Phu or the early phases of the Geneva Conference; this 
was left mostly to the State and Defense Departments. In 
terms of decision making, Eisenhower consulted with several 
agencies before taking action. The decision not to intervene 
with operation VULTURE was arrived at after talks not only 
with Secretary Dulles, the NSC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
but also Congress and the British government. During the 
Geneva negotiations Eisenhower continued to negotiate with 
the French on conditions for potential US military 
intervention. Even the final Geneva agreement required the 
negotiated "seven-point plan" prior to American approval. 
Overall the approach allowed for a deliberate examination of 
the issues prior to making any final decision. 
Eisenhower used a modified formalistic approach to 
organizing his foreign policy apparatus. He created a highly 
structured hierarchical NSC system to better integrate 
foreign policy among the major governmental agencies. He 
further established a relationship with his Secretary of 
State such that he relied on him to conduct foreign policy. 
This autonomy allowed Dulles to take action when the 
situation dictated. The Indochina Crisis illustrates that 
the formalistic aspects had very little impact on the overall 
results. Rather it was Eisenhower's use of Dulles that served 
as the predominant force in the resolution of the crisis. The 
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contributions of the formalistic aspects, namely the NSC, 
were in terms of long range planning and threat warning. This 
was balanced by Dulles, who was able to provide the 
responsiveness required in a crisis situation. Therefore a 
formalistic approach can work best if there is another 




III.THE KENNEDY FOREIGN POLICY ORGANIZATION 
Richard Johnson has characterized John F. Kennedy's 
approach to organizing the US foreign policy machinery as 
collegial because Kennedy concentrated on managing the 
personalities of his advisors in order to cultivate a close- 
knit team that could analyze and resolve foreign policy 
issues.48 Kennedy projected the image of a vital and vigorous 
leader who would re-energize the country in foreign affairs.49 
Kennedy wanted to establish himself as the maker of US 
foreign policy and gathered trusted confidants around him to 
achieve this end. Kennedy did not care for formal 
organization and preferred a more personalized leadership 
style; lack of structure was perhaps the biggest flaw in the 
Kennedy foreign policy organization. Kennedy depended upon 
various task forces and survey missions to manage the Vietnam 
problem; the use of these devices led to the creation of ad 
hoc policies rather than effective long term solutions. 
President Kennedy preferred a personal style of 
leadership and relied primarily on a small group of advisers 
to manage foreign policy. This reliance on close advisors 
rather than a structured system occurred for several reasons. 
48Johnson, Manging the White House,   7. 
49Amos A Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, American 
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First, based upon recommendations from the Jackson 
Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Kennedy dismantled 
Eisenhower's NSC structure by first eliminating its support 
organizations, the Planning Board and Operations Coordinating 
Board, and then reducing the size of the NSC staff. This 
resulted in the consolidation of power in the National 
Security Advisor, making the position a more powerful force 
in foreign affairs. Second, Kennedy initially entrusted the 
State Department to carry out his foreign policy objectives 
but quickly became frustrated with State when it was unable 
to take action. As Secretary of State, Dean Rusk was a superb 
technician, but was not the aggressive foreign policy maker 
that Kennedy seemingly desired from the State Department. 
Ultimately, Rusk remained a low-key advisor who managed the 
State Department rather than provide the bold, innovative 
ideas that Kennedy would have preferred50. Finally, the 
Kennedy Administration's first crisis, the Bay of Pigs 
debacle, created a lack of trust between the President and 
the CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff that persisted for most of 
Kennedy's tenure. These three factors: absence of the 
systematic analysis of the NSC, lack of dynamic action from 
the State Department and a level of distrust caused by the 
Bay of Pigs disaster, drove Kennedy to rely primarily on his 
close advisors in conducting foreign affairs. In order to 
50 
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better understand Kennedy's collegial approach, we need to 
analyze his foreign policy organization in terms of these 
factors. 
A.KENNEDY'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
The transition from the Eisenhower to Kennedy 
Administrations led to major changes in the American foreign 
policy apparatus, in particular the National Security 
Council. One of the major initiators of change was Senator 
Henry Jackson of Washington State, whose Senate Subcommittee 
on the National Policy Machinery investigated the Eisenhower 
NSC. Henry "Scoop" Jackson developed a respected expertise 
in foreign affairs. In 1959 Jackson delivered a speech at the 
Naval War College that accused President Eisenhower of 
mismanaging foreign policy and that the National Security 
Council was a "dangerously misleading facade." It is ironic 
that Eisenhower was accused of the same charges that were 
leveled at the Truman Administration ten years earlier. 
Jackson was concerned that the processes of the National 
Security Council were compromising American foreign policy 
rather than defining optimal solutions. Eisenhower viewed 
these Congressional hearings as an infringement on his 
presidential power and at first did not cooperate with the 
committee. Only after agreement upon the conditions on which 
officials of Eisenhower's NSC would appear before the 
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committee did the Eisenhower Administration cooperate with 
Jackson's subcommittee. But despite the best efforts of 
Robert Cutler to explain the NSC process, the committee was 
not convinced. The Committee found that the NSC system was 
far too bureaucratic to provide the President with meaningful 
advice; the policy papers created by the Planning Board did 
not represent actual US policy, but rather were "mere 
statements of aspiration"51 and that the interdepartmental 
coordinating committees, the Planning and Operations 
Coordinating Boards, were ineffective. The NSC had become a 
paper-mill that simply produced masses of documents which 
required continual revision. President-elect Kennedy reviewed 
the Jackson Committee recommendations and tasked his National 
Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy to reorganize the NSC system 
accordingly. 
As the Special Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy began to rise in political 
prominence as the National Security Advisor by consolidating 
the power of the NSC. Bundy, a Yale graduate and lecturer at 
Harvard, was among the brightest of Kennedy's men; he was 
considered for the Secretary of State position but was 
thought too young to take on that role. He refused to take a 
lesser job at the State Department and was then made the 
51
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National Security Advisor. In temperament and intellect he 
was well suited to Kennedy's style, perhaps because they had 
shared a common upbringing. In his new role Bundy assumed 
"the jobs of no fewer than five senior Eisenhower national- 
security-staff-aides"52 which included the Executive Secretary 
and General Goodpaster's Staff Secretary duties. The 
incorporation of the major roles did not immediately provide 
Bundy significant power. Not until several months after the 
Bay of Pigs incident did the National Security Advisor begin 
to gain the confidence of the President. 
Mac Bundy took his mandate for change from the President 
and radically altered structure of the NSC. Bundy viewed the 
Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board as 
"rigid and paper-ridden"53 and that these interdepartmental 
organizations were grossly inefficient. Bundy thus eliminated 
both institutions by combining the planning and operations 
process into a single entity. Bundy then reduced the size of 
the NSC staff and organized the remaining staff to cover 
specific regions.54 The elimination of the Planning Board 
meant that the formal process of creating policy papers was 
also terminated. Policy papers were replaced by National 
52Destler, Own Worst Enemy, 183. 
53Bromley K. Smith, Organizational History of the National Security 
Council during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Monograph 
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Security Action Memorandums (NSAM), authored primarily by 
Bundy, which covered a whole host of topics from instructions 
to various agencies, presidential requests for information 
and definitive policy statements.55 Finally, during the 
Kennedy tenure the number of NSC meeting was drastically 
reduced from Eisenhower's time. During the first four years 
of his Administration, Eisenhower attended 115 meetings of 
the Council, most of which he chaired himself.56 During 
Kennedy's first two years he attended thirty-one meetings 
until October of 196257. The smaller number of NSC meetings 
simply reflected Kennedy's dislike for formal meetings and a 
greater reliance on more personal inter-action with his 
advisors. 
The dismantling of the Eisenhower NSC served to 
establish Kennedy's presence as the new President. The new 
NSC was smaller, more flexible and far more responsive to 
Kennedy's needs, but there were costs to this new structure. 
First, combining the planning and operations function would 
require the NSC to be more involved in actual operations. 
Rather than maintaining its advisory role established in the 
previous two administrations, the National Security Advisor 
and  the NSC would become policy advocates.  Second, 
55Smith, Organizational History,   23. 
56Robert Cutler, The Development of the National Security Council, 
Foreign Affairs  34, 1956. 441-458. 
57Prados, Keepers of the Keys,   106. 
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eliminating the Planning Board process put an end to 
maintaining a sort of corporate knowledge. The Eisenhower NSC 
papers served not only to define America's position on 
national security issues but also acted as a "reservoir" of 
foreign policy guidance. Focusing on the point that the NSC 
only served as a paper mill misses its greater purpose 
altogether. Third, the NSC served as a forum for the 
integration of political military affairs; issues could be 
argued, the President would make a determination and every 
major player involved knew the US position and thus could 
direct his agency towards achieving that end. If a structure 
like Eisenhower's NSC had existed during President Johnson's 
Administration, then LBJ could have reappraised American 
involvement in Vietnam more critically.58 The responsibilities 
that the Kennedy NSC had given up were to be taken up by the 
State Department. 
B.SECRETARY    OF    STATE    DEAN    RUSK 
Kennedy wanted his Secretary of State to be his primary 
advisor on foreign affairs and for the State Department to 
"take  charge"   and  conduct   foreign  policy.   Kennedy   selected 
58Richard E.  Neustadt and Ernest R.  May,   Thinking in Time:  The Uses of 
History for Decision Makers,   (New York:  The Free Press,   1986),   89.       The 
authors  suggest that had Johnson's  staff been more rigorous  in analyzing 
historic analogies then Johnson would have been forced to directly 
confront the Vietnam crisis rather than delay a solution. 
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Dean Rusk who was a quiet, thoughtful and hard working man. A 
former Rhodes scholar, he served as an infantry officer in 
China and Burma during World War II. After the war he joined 
the State Department and worked for President Truman as the 
Under Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Rusk was 
certainly well qualified in terms of experience, but there 
were three factors that prevented him from becoming the 
Secretary of State that Kennedy wanted. 
First, Rusk believed that it was up to the President to 
establish foreign policy and that the Secretary supported the 
President. Rusk viewed his role as solely an advisor to the 
President, not an advocate of policy; he would help the 
President analyze foreign policy issues but not promote a 
solution. Kennedy fully supported Rusk but would have 
preferred if his Secretary of State "would assert himself 
more boldly, recommend solutions more explicitly, offer 
imaginative alternatives to Pentagon plans more frequently 
and govern the Department of State more vigorously."59 Another 
factor that worked against Rusk were the appointments of the 
Under Secretary positions at State. Kennedy had placed his 
own men in these positions rather than allowing Rusk to build 
his own team. This meant that these appointees were loyal to 
Kennedy and not to Rusk. Kennedy would consult directly these 
Under Secretaries, thus circumventing Rusk. Finally, even 
59Sorensen, Kennedy,   271. 
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though Kennedy clearly stated that he would rely on the 
Secretary of State for managing foreign affairs, there were 
many other advisors the President would consult. General 
Maxwell Taylor, UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Ambassador 
Averell Harriman and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. were among the 
few who provided Kennedy with alternative sources of 
information and advice. This competition reduced the 
influence and primacy of Secretary Rusk. Under Eisenhower 
Secretary Dulles guarded his close ties with the President by 
pushing out other potential advisers. Dean Rusk's quiet 
demeanor would not let him become an aggressive Secretary of 
State. Kennedy was never satisfied with the performance of 
the State Department and his dissatisfaction increased 
immensely after the Bay of Pigs. 
C. THE BAY OF PIGS 
The Bay of Pigs invasion significantly affected the 
manner in which President Kennedy conducted foreign policy 
for the rest of his tenure. The operation was started during 
the Eisenhower Administration by the CIA and briefed to 
Kennedy while he was President-elect. The concept was to 
land a brigade of fourteen hundred Cuban exiles who would 
then battle Fidel Castro's forces, overthrow the dictator and 
liberate the island. Briefings from CIA director Allen 
Dulles and CIA Deputy Director for Planning Richard Bissel, 
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along with assurances from the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
guaranteeing success, swayed Kennedy to approve the plan. 
But Kennedy made the stipulation that US forces could not 
provide overt support to the Cuban exiles, otherwise the US 
would violate its own policy and international law by openly 
intervening in another country. Such actions would not only 
bring international condemnation upon the US, but possibly 
precipitate hostile responses from the Soviets in Berlin. 
Based upon the advice of the CIA and Joint Chiefs, Kennedy 
went ahead with the plan. On April 17, 1961 the landing took 
place. Initially the brigade fought well and inflicted heavy 
casualties against a twenty thousand man Cuban force. 
Unfortunately, due to a lack of supplies and air support, the 
brigade was eventually overrun and captured by Castro's 
forces. The incident became an embarrassment to the US when 
it could not hide American support of the operation. Kennedy 
"was aghast at his own stupidity, angry at having been badly 
advised by some and let down by others."60 But he alone made 
the final decision to go ahead with the invasion and took 
full responsibility for its failure. 
The decision making process that approved the Bay of 
Pigs invasion was flawed and should have either taken steps 
to ensure the operation was conducted without implicating the 
US or canceled the invasion altogether. The failure of the 
60Sorensen, Kennedy,   295. 
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operation can be attributed to fact that the Kennedy 
Administration had just taken reigns of power and had not 
been confident enough to question the feasibility of the 
invasion. The plan was initiated by the previous 
administration and advocated strongly by the CIA director. 
Kennedy trusted the estimates of Dulles and Bissel and though 
both men were hold-overs from the previous administration, 
they had highly regarded reputations. To his own fault 
Kennedy did not seriously question or challenge the validity 
of the chances for the operation's success. The manner in 
which the plan was presented to Kennedy placed the President 
in a poor political position; if he failed to take immediate 
action, then the Castro regime could not be defeated in the 
future because it would be too strong. Further, it would make 
Kennedy appear weak on Communism by denying the Cuban exiles 
their attempt to retake their homeland. Kennedy believed 
that his requirement for no overt US assistance would be 
taken into account by the CIA and the Cuban brigade. The key 
members of Kennedy's own foreign policy team did not oppose 
the plan. The NSC and the State Department failed to 
critically examine the political ramifications of such an 
operation, while the Defense Department did not evaluate the 
military feasibility of such an operation. The incident 
served as a wake-up call to the entire administration that 
changes needed to be made to its foreign policy machinery. 
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The major lesson to be learned from the Bay of Pigs was 
that the President needed to be more fully engaged in foreign 
affairs. He would not repeat the same mistake of the Bay of 
Pigs again. The President needed people he could trust to 
help him manage foreign affairs. He would concentrate on 
developing personal ties with his advisors before trusting 
the established governmental structure to manage foreign 
policy. Kennedy had taken apart the foreign policy mechanisms 
that previously existed, which was his prerogative, but he 
replaced it with another mechanism that did not live up to 
his expectations. Kennedy's only course of action then was to 
depend upon his close advisors. 
Overall the Kennedy Administration certainly lacked the 
structure present in the previous administration. This suited 
Kennedy just fine, even though the collegial approach took up 
much of his time, required him to manage conflict among his 
advisors, and guide the work of the group towards a 
solution. This approach was most successful during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, when the threat was defined and imminent; all 
advisors involved realized that national survival was at 
stake and a dedicated collegial effort towards finding a 
peaceful resolution was required. But the missile crisis of 
October 1962 presented a unique situation. When this 
collegial approach was applied to the problems of Vietnam, 
the outcomes were not as successful, despite the best efforts 
of Kennedy and his men. 
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Kennedy's Vietnam policy is illustrative of his 
collegial approach. Almost every decision he made with regard 
to US policy towards Vietnam was made on the basis of 
recommendations from his advisors and rarely at any sort of 
formal meeting. This method served to produce temporary 
solutions that resolved immediate issues. But in the long run 
the immediate responses did not address the fundamental 
problems and forced America to commit its national capital 
into a war that should not have been fought. 
The danger of the collegial approach is that it can 
inadvertently lead to incremental responses rather than 
development of long term polices. The various task forces and 
survey missions Kennedy used to analyze the Vietnam problem 
developed immediate short-term solutions. By their very 
nature, task forces and survey missions are created to deal 
with a specific situation, once they have completed their 
report the group is disbanded. Any long range objectives were 
noted but could not be pursued adequately because the task 
force or mission that recommended the solution no longer 
existed to follow-up on the issue. This leads to another 
problem with the collegial approach: accountability for the 
decisions of the group. Since this approach relies on a great 
deal of personal interaction between subordinates and the 
decision maker, the responsibility for a solution tends to 
rest upon the group. The fault here is that there can be 
mutual support within the group for a poor solution; in such 
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an instance everyone is to blame, but there is no one held 
accountable. 
D.THE VIETNAM DILEMMA 1961-1963 
John Kennedy did not have a specific plan to deal with 
the Vietnam problem. When he assumed the Presidency his 
foreign policy agenda included dealing with the Soviet Union, 
Cuba, Berlin, Laos, the Congo and Nuclear Testing. Vietnam 
was certainly an important problem related to the larger 
issue of Communism, but it was viewed as simply another item 
on the list with which to contend. 
Kennedy's views remained consistent as to American 
interest in Vietnam and the commitment of US troops to the 
region. As a senator in 1954 he supported the French cause in 
Indochina but did not want to send American combat troops 
into a fight to save Dien Bien Phu. In 1956 he restated the 
"domino principle" that Vietnam was vital to preventing 
Communist expansion into the rest of Southeast Asia. In late 
1961 he continued to believe that US forces should not be 
engaged in combat in Southeast Asia. Once Kennedy was 
President he tried to delay for as long as possible any 
deployment of US ground forces into Vietnam. Kennedy 
maintained the middle ground between total war and not losing 
Vietnam; "his essential contribution...was both to raise our 
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commitment and to keep it limited."61 Unfortunately, this 
approach to solving the Vietnam dilemma did not well serve 
American objectives in Southeast Asia. 
The Kennedy Administration continued the Eisenhower 
Administration policy of supporting South Vietnam against a 
possible Communist take-over. The objective of preventing the 
fall of South Vietnam to the Communists was never questioned; 
Kennedy and his Administration viewed the Communist take-over 
of Southeast Asia as a major threat to the national security 
of the United States and required America to take a stand in 
the region by supporting South Vietnam. Vietnam was a vital 
interest and worth staking US national prestige in order to 
keep South Vietnam free from Communism. But Kennedy also 
stated that it was Vietnam's war to win or lose, which meant 
that the US would not defend Vietnam at all costs; it was up 
to the Vietnamese to determine their own fate. In reality 
Diem and South Vietnam could not win without American support 
and this fact placed US policy in a quandary. The Kennedy 
Administration assumed that through the use of military 
force, either the South Vietnamese army or the US military, 
that its strategic objectives could be achieved. This policy 
ignored or minimized the fact that South Vietnam required a 
stable government in order to oppose the threat from the 
North; otherwise no amount of military effort would be to 
61Sorensen, Kennedy,   652. 
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purpose. The US continued to support Diem despite his 
inability to establish a stable government, and only after he 
no longer could support American objectives for Vietnam did 
the US abandon him. 
Kennedy's collegial approach is evident in dealing with 
the problems caused by Vietnam. He would rely on the advice 
of his advisers in order to make his decisions; the result 
was a series of temporary solutions with no serious debate 
about American purposes in Vietnam. Kennedy's actions to 
deal with the Vietnamese dilemma can be divided into two 
phases. The first phase occurred during the first two years 
of his Administration, when he tried to grapple with such 
issues while taking care not to get America too involved in 
the war. The second phase involved the decisions to back the 
coup against Ngo Dinh Diem. Kennedy's short-term solutions 
during his abbreviated tenure, along with his radical 
alteration of the foreign policy apparatus, would later 
become detrimental to Lyndon Johnson as America slowly sank 
into the quagmire which became "Vietnam". 
Kennedy realized that the South Vietnam situation was 
serious and could turn into a far greater crisis. The war 
was not going well for the South, and Diem's inability to 
create a stable government was punctuated by a coup attempt 
in November of 1960. The fall of Diem seemed imminent, and 
with it, American prestige and strategic objectives for 
Southeast Asia. Kennedy tried to take steps early on in his 
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administration to resolve the problem. In January 1961 he 
approved the Counter Insurgency Plan (CIP) which increased 
the size of the ARVN and provided equipment and training to 
the Civil Guard in order to better deal with the war. In the 
same month he was given a report written by General Edward 
Lansdale that stated the situation was getting worse and 
required additional US assistance or risk losing Vietnam. 
Lansdale was a CIA operative who had helped Diem defeat his 
political enemies and consolidate power in 1954. The report 
served to jar Kennedy to take more vigorous action and led to 
the establishment of the Gilpatric Task Force. Rosewell 
Gilpatric was the Deputy Secretary of Defense and his group 
was ordered to study measures to save Vietnam. The Task Force 
recommended that the CIP effort be stepped up with further 
increases in the size to the ARVN forces; the report also 
pointed out that steps needed to be taken to resolve South 
Vietnam's internal security problem. The final Gilpatric 
Report "advised making explicit a firm commitment to do 
whatever would be necessary to defend South Vietnam."62 The 
State Department, which assumed control over the task force, 
took this commitment to mean additional US forces. The State 
Department redrafted the report with the references to 
"commitment" removed and turned it into NSAM 52. This 
62Leslie H.Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam:The System 
Worked  (Washington D.C.:The Brookings Institute, 1979), 72. 
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document defined the US purpose in Vietnam as supporting the 
South Vietnamese but more importantly did not commit anymore 
resources than already promised by the Kennedy 
Administration. 
President Kennedy never seemed to have a firm grasp on 
the situation in Vietnam nor did he have enough information 
on which to base his decisions. He repeatedly sent survey 
missions to Vietnam in order to get a first-hand assessment. 
But these missions tended to interview the same people and 
never uncovered the true nature of the problem. One of the 
first of these missions was the May 1961 Lyndon Johnson tour 
of the Far East. In an attempt to demonstrate US support and 
bolster Diem, the Vice President hailed the South Vietnamese 
leader as the Winston Churchill of Asia. Johnson realized 
this was a gross overstatement but simply reflected the 
Administration's view that Diem was "the only boy we got out 
there."63 In June of 1961 another survey team, headed by 
Eugene Staley of the Stanford Research Institute, went to 
Vietnam to assess the economic situation. This group's 
results focused more on the economics of sustaining ARVN 
force levels rather than the economic development of the 
country.64 The most significant of the early survey missions 
occurred in October 1961 and was led by the President's 
63Karnow, Vietnam,   230. 
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military advisor Maxwell Taylor. After this survey mission 
the Kennedy Administration would become divided over how to 
deal with Vietnam, and American commitment would deepen. 
The Taylor mission was important because it suggested 
to Kennedy that the US deploy its own forces to demonstrate 
its resolve in keeping South Vietnam Communist-free. Maxwell 
Taylor was the quintessential intellectual warrior and a man 
whom John Kennedy could trust. The President turned to Taylor 
to investigate the failure at the Bay of Pigs and made Taylor 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 1962. But in late 1961 
Kennedy wanted Taylor to determine "courses of action...to 
avoid a further deterioration of the situation in South 
Vietnam."65 The President further stipulated: "In your 
assessment you should bear in mind that the initial 
responsibility for the effective maintenance of the 
independence of South Vietnam rests with the people and 
government of that country."66 Placing Taylor in charge of a 
major survey mission without any equally high ranking State 
Department member reflected the weakness of that department 
and Kennedy's continued emphasis on military solutions. 
In two weeks Taylor and his team traveled throughout 
Vietnam gathering information from personal interviews and 
observations. The mission concluded that the situation in 
65Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares  (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company,Inc., 1972), 225. 
66 Ibid., 225, 
57 
Vietnam was serious, but with US assistance in the form of a 
"limited partnership", South Vietnam could overcome these 
problems. Taylor made several recommendations, the major one 
being the deployment of an 8,000-man logistics battalion to 
assist with disaster relief in the Mekong Delta. Other 
recommendations included providing additional advisors and 
training, building up the local guard and to re-evaluate the 
US economic assistance program. But the logistics battalion 
recommendation brought the most attention because it 
committed US forces. Taylor warned the President of the risks 
such a deployment would entail; such a move could lead to 
greater involvement and increased tensions. But the size of 
the US force could provide the President with some political 
flexibility and send a message to the Viet Minh, as well as 
to the South Vietnamese, that America was serious about its 
commitments to South Vietnam. 
The Taylor recommendation drew serious criticisms from 
the Defense and State Departments. McNamara evaluated the 
force to be too small and that a 200,000 man presence would 
be required to make any difference in the war effort. He 
warned that a clearly defined commitment to preventing the 
fall of South Vietnam could not be achieved without the 
introduction of US forces into the war.67 Secretary Rusk 
believed that Vietnam was "a simple military problem, 
67Prados, Keepers,   127, 
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amenable to a military solution."68 He did not approve of a 
wider US commitment of troops but supported providing 
military assistance to the Vietnamese. Rusk and McNamara 
presented the President a memorandum proposing the US make 
"the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of 
preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism and that, 
in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United 
States and other SEATO forces may be necessary to achieve 
this objective."69 In essence, the memorandum recommended 
taking specific actions to militarily support the South 
Vietnamese and to explicitly define American intentions in 
the region to the international community. Kennedy accepted 
the recommendations, again with the exception of committing 
the US to preventing the fall of the South, and in November 
1961 turned the memorandum into NSAM 111 entitled "First 
Phase of Vietnam Program."70 Kennedy could now provide 
military support to South Vietnam without committing the US 
to a war and could defer a decision on sending American 
troops until later.71 
By the end of 1961 Kennedy had developed a course of 
action for American policy in Vietnam.  He selected a path 
68ibid., 125. 




between sending US forces to fight in Vietnam and abandoning 
Southeast Asia altogether. The President was able to solve 
the immediate problems without deepening the US military 
commitment; arrival of military aid was able to forestall the 
defeat of Diem in the South. Perhaps Kennedy believed he 
bought time to resolve the Vietnamese dilemma in the future. 
But delaying the resolution would not achieve US purposes in 
Vietnam; making the ARVN a more effective fighting force 
through training and reorganization would not create an 
effective South Vietnamese government. 
During 1961 and 1962 Kennedy had received indications 
that South Vietnam had serious political problems that would 
threaten American purposes in Vietnam unless they were dealt 
with. All attempts at political reforms were unsuccessful due 
for the most part to Diem's refusal to change. From 1954 to 
1961 the Eisenhower Administration pursued a strategy of 
repeatedly pressuring Diem into making reforms. But Diem 
learned that he could delay or ignore American demands 
because he knew that the US would only support him. Diem may 
have been a sincere Vietnamese nationalist, but he was going 
to rule the South on his terms and not as a Western style 
democracy. On several occasions Kennedy had been warned of 
such political problems. During the October 1961 Taylor 
mission other members  of the team noted a general 
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dissatisfaction among the population with Diem.72 Taylor 
himself heard complaints from the Commanding General of the 
Field Command about Diem's performance."73 At Kennedy's 
request Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith went to Vietnam to 
evaluate the situation for the President. The Ambassador's 
determination was bleak: "no reform was possible unless the 
United States got rid of Diem."74 Finally, in 1962 Senator 
Mike Mansfield pointed out Diem's shortcomings, discovered 
during his survey mission, and that the US needed to reassess 
its interests in Vietnam.75 But Kennedy did not pay any 
serious heed to the deteriorating political situation. 
Perhaps the US did not strongly emphasize reforms, in part, 
so as not to alienate Diem but also not to accelerate his 
downfall. For the rest of 1961 and all of 1962 America 
continued to concentrate on a military solution to Vietnam 
without entangling US forces; any attempts at achieving a 
political solution were feeble efforts at best. 
Kennedy's temporary solution wore out by mid-1963 and he 
now had to face the political problem. For a short time after 
the delivery of additional US aid, the war went fairly well; 
even by McNamara's quantifiable factors the US was winning in 
72Karnow, Vietnam,   269. 
73Taylor, Swords and Plowshares,   234. 
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1962.76 But due to lack of progress with political and 
economic reforms and growing civil unrest, Diem's regime was 
again threatened with collapse. The situation did not come 
to a head until May 1963, when Diem's governmental attacks 
upon Buddhist protesters at Hue drew harsh criticism from 
Washington. Protests against Diem's repression intensified 
when the Buddhist monk campaign of self-immolations began in 
June. Ambassador Frederick Nolting urged Diem to reconcile 
with the Buddhists, but Diem only made minor concessions and 
insisted that the Viet Cong were responsible for the attacks. 
Any credibility Diem had built towards coming to terms with 
the Buddhists was destroyed when his government launched 
attacks against their Pagodas on August 21, 1963. The 
incident served to prompt Kennedy Administration officials 
into taking actions that would lead to Diem's downfall. 
In June 1963 Kennedy had named Henry Cabot Lodge to take 
over Nolting's job as Ambassador. Lodge was the Republican 
Vice Presidential nominee who ran against Kennedy in 1960, 
and his appointment was considered a politically deft move. 
The pagoda attacks occurred while Lodge was in Hawaii 
receiving intelligence briefs from CINCPAC; he was ordered by 
Washington to leave immediately for Saigon to get control of 
the situation.  Upon his arrival Lodge was briefed on the 
76Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days:  John F.  Kennedy in the White 
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events and that Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's brother, and his special 
forces were responsible for the attacks and not the South 
Vietnamese Army, as had been reported by the Voice of 
America. Lodge reported that responsibility for the attacks 
belonged to Nhu and that Diem probably approved. He also 
noted that several ARVN generals had made queries about US 
support if they launched a coup against Diem. 
In Washington, State Department and White House 
officials George Ball, Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman and 
Michael Forrestal quickly drafted a controversial cable in 
response to the attacks. In effect the message stated that 
the US did not approve of the attacks against the Buddhists, 
that Nhu could no longer remain in power, and Diem should be 
given the opportunity to get rid of his brother himself: if 
"Diem remains obdurant and refuses, then we must face the 
possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved."77 
Further, that the US would stop economic and military support 
if Diem did not take action to remove Nhu. Lodge was to also 
notify the ARVN generals plotting the coup that they would 
have US support.78 Lodge received the cable enthusiastically, 
fully supported its intentions and took steps to implement it 
immediately. 
^Pentagon Papers,  Vol.2, 235. 
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The controversy about the cable occurred over the manner 
in which it was approved for transmission to Lodge. The 
message was drafted over a weekend when the President and 
his principal senior advisors were all out of town. The 
drafters were able to get ahold of the President and several 
advisors to brief them on the contents of the cable; each 
member apparently understood the contents of the message 
because they gave their approval to release the cable to 
Lodge. Only after the cable was sent did the President and 
his advisors realize its significance and begin to have 
second thoughts about supporting a coup. This initiated a 
series of heated NSC meetings the following week to discuss a 
new policy approach. 
The NSC meetings of late August 1963 centered around 
whether the US should continue to support Diem or support a 
coup against him. The President's advisors were divided over 
a new course of action and struggled to find an answer. The 
State Department voiced concerns that Diem's persecution of 
the Buddhists had alienated any remaining popular support he 
had within the country and that American policy objectives 
were at an end while Diem was in power. The Defense 
Department pushed for continued support of Diem since he was 
the only person strong enough to lead South Vietnam in the 
war against the North. Kennedy received the personal 
assessments of Ambassador Lodge and the commander of the 
military advisory group, General Paul Harkin; they were also 
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split in their views, Lodge wanting to back the coup while 
Harkin wanted to give Diem one more chance. Kennedy asked for 
Ambassador Nolting's opinion; Nolting, who had cultivated a 
trusting relationship with Diem, urged that the US continue 
to support him. But Under Secretary Averell Harriman 
strongly disagreed and "felt that Nolting had been profoundly 
wrong all along in his advice to 'go along' with Diem."79 On 
two occasions Kennedy went so far as to go around to each 
advisor and ask his assessment of the situation. In the end 
each side argued the alternatives and agreed the US could not 
ignore the pagoda attacks, but the NSC could not come up with 
a solution. 
Kennedy's indecisive Vietnam policy had painted his 
Administration into a corner by limiting its options. 
Kennedy decided on the most politically acceptable route and 
sought methods by which to pressure Diem into changing his 
policies; this was simply a continuation of the old approach. 
Kennedy also had to deal with the coup. He authorized Lodge 
to suspend American aid when he deemed it necessary and to 
tell the generals that they would get US support only if they 
revealed their plans. On August 31 the generals called off 
the coup because they were unsure about US intentions and 
they could not secure control of the Saigon military 
79Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation:  The Politics of Foreign Policy in the 
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district. Thus the NSC meetings of the previous four days had 
turned out to be in vain. This entire incident is most 
telling of the Kennedy Administration and how it dealt with 
the Vietnam dilemma; it required a serious threat to a major 
strategic objective for the Kennedy's foreign policy team to 
even begin a search for alternative strategies to their 
flawed Vietnam policy. 
From September to October of 1963 the Kennedy 
Administration tried to forge a new Vietnam policy, but the 
best the US could do was to pursue old strategies. Kennedy 
said of US efforts: "We are using our influence...to persuade 
the government there to take those steps which will win back 
support. That takes some time and we must be patient, we must 
persist."80 America again tried to make it clear to Diem that 
the US could not tolerate his treatment of the Buddhists and 
that he must reform if he was to enjoy continued US support. 
Diem did not change because he viewed the Buddhist protests 
as a threat to his government; his objectives had diverged 
from America's and he would do whatever was required to 
remain in power. The US plan was to carry out a series of 
"graduated pressures" in the form of restricting economic 
assistance and continuing a dialogue with Diem to encourage 
80Weldon A.Brown, Prelude to Disaster:  The American Role in Vietnam 
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him to reform.  Meanwhile the generals were regrouping for 
another coup attempt. 
The Kennedy Administration was confused over the status 
of the coup and never committed to a definitive position on 
whether to support or oppose it. Kennedy tried to place the 
US in a position where it would benefit from a coup but not 
incur any of the costs if one failed. On October 5 Kennedy 
cabled Lodge, assuming the coup was off, that "no initiative 
should now be taken to give any covert encouragement to a 
coup. There should, however, be an urgent effort...to 
identify and build contact with possible alternative 
leadership as and when it appears."81 The generals plotting 
the coup wanted confirmation of US support. On October 6 
Washington stated in another cable that the US would not 
"thwart a change of government or deny economic and military 
assistance to a new regime."82 The generals took this to be a 
vote of confidence for the coup and set the date for the 1st 
of November. 
Even after making statements to the effect the US would 
not take preventive action against the coup, the Kennedy 
Administration continued to waiver in its decision. Mac 
Bundy was worried about the chances of success: the US 
"should not be in a position of thwarting a coup, we would 
81Karnow, Vietnam,   310. Also see Pentagon Papers,  Vol.2, 257, for 
portion of actual message to Lodge. 
82 Pentagon Papers,  Vol. 2, 257. 
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like to have the option of judging and warning on any plan 
with poor prospects."83 Not knowing the coup plan troubled 
the administration, General Harkin, a Diem supporter, stirred 
the pot by sending several messages to Maxwell Taylor that 
opposed the coup and gave it little chance of success.84 
Lodge countered with the fact that the coup was imminent and 
that any change in the South Vietnamese government would be 
in the best interests of the US. Right up until the end, the 
Kennedy Administration waffled; they wanted to retain the 
ability to stop the coup and yet not be involved in the coup 
itself. This lack of decisiveness and fear of taking risks 
was symptomatic of the entire Vietnam policy and would 
eventually lead America into a costly war. 
The coup started in the late morning of November 1 with 
the seizure of several governmental buildings in Saigon. 
Diem and Nhu eluded rebel forces at the palace and were on 
the run for most of the day. The brothers were finally 
captured at a Catholic church. On their way to the Vietnamese 
Joint General Staff they were murdered in an armored 
personnel carrier. The news of the assassination apparently 
shocked Kennedy and his advisors. A new government formed on 
November 5 and by November 8 had received US recognition. By 
late November NSAM 27 3 was drafted and restated US purposes 
83Karnow, Vietnam,   314, 
84Pentagon Papers,  Vol. 2, 220. 
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in Vietnam were "to assist the people and Government of that 
country to win their contest against the externally directed 
and supported Communist conspiracy."85 The US then provided 
the new South Vietnamese government with military and 
economic aid at the same levels as the Diem regime and 
encouraged a renewed vigorous campaign against the 
Communists. Now with Diem out of the way, the focus could 
return to getting on with the business of fighting the war. 
After Diem there would be a succession of Generals who tried 
to govern and were eventually overthrown themselves; 
ultimately no effective government would emerge in South 
Vietnam until the fall of Saigon in 1975. 
John F. Kennedy was assassinated three weeks after Diem, 
and Lyndon Johnson ascended to the Chief Executive position. 
Johnson inherited the legacy of a dead man - this included an 
administration not of his choosing and Vietnam.  The foreign 
policy organization created by Kennedy was not suited to 
Johnson's style and LBJ struggled to manage Kennedy's men. 
Johnson simply continued Kennedy's policies and put the 
Vietnam issue on hold until after the 1964 national 
elections. Once elected on his own merits, Johnson tried to 
deal with Vietnam using the Kennedy collegial approach and 
only succeeded in getting America deeper into a war it could 
not win. The formalistic mechanisms created during the 
85Pentagon Papers,   276. 
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Eisenhower Administration would have benefited Lyndon 
Johnson. This would have been no guarantee that increased 
American involvement would not have occurred, but it would 
have forced the President to face the problem directly, 
understand the fundamental issues, and make him think 
critically before committing American prestige and resources 
to an unattainable cause. 
E.EVALUATION OF THE KENNEDY APPROACH 
Overall, despite its failure to face the Vietnam dilemma 
head-on, the Kennedy foreign policy organization fulfilled 
most of the criteria. First, the degree to which Kennedy's 
collegial approach screened out vital information was 
dependent upon how much Kennedy trusted his advisors 
assessments. Kennedy received his information through 
intelligence cables from the White House Situation Room and 
from first-hand accounts of his envoys. He sent multiple 
survey missions into Vietnam to examine the problem. Despite 
the inherent problems of these survey missions, they were the 
primary source that provided Kennedy with a picture of the 
problem. The President received a variety of reports, from 
Taylor's positive evaluation of the crisis to the negative 
reports from Galbraith and Mansfield which, in sum, 
represented the entire scope of the Vietnam problem. Given 
the diversity of the reports, any distortion occurred in 
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Kennedy's own mind, since he ultimately had to sort the 
information for himself. Perhaps the problem lay in the 
differing reports. On one occasion the Krulak-Mendenhall 
mission of September 1963 returned with opposite views of the 
crisis. Kennedy was to have remarked to the envoys: "You two 
did visit the same country, didn't you?"86 
Kennedy was exposed to substantive conflict, but the 
arguments were focused over the manner in which to support 
the military effort in Vietnam. The Taylor report raised 
legitimate questions about the cost of increased involvement. 
The State and Defense department were at odds over the 
consequences of deploying US forces into the region. But 
Rusk and McNamara were able to compromise and develop NSAM 
111 which allowed the President to postpone the decision to 
send US forces. The meetings of late August 1963 provided 
several instances for Kennedy to witness the conflict among 
his advisors. The cable of 24 August was a source of 
conflict. The verbal exchange between Nolting and Harriman 
was another. There was also conflict between Ambassador 
Lodge and the Senior Military Advisor, General Harkin. In 
each instance Kennedy selected the middle ground - a solution 
that would diffuse the internal administration conflict. Each 
of these incidents served to illustrate the frustration the 
86Karnow, Vietnam, 309. 
71 
Vietnam policy had caused and should have been a signal that 
the US needed a major policy review. 
The Kennedy Administration's responsiveness depended 
upon the urgency of the problem. In the case of Vietnam, the 
initial decisions to provide Diem additional support without 
committing US forces required almost a year of repeated 
survey missions and fact finding before Kennedy decided upon 
an acceptable solution. Kennedy concentrated on allowing the 
Vietnamese to fight the war and that the US would only 
provide the means. He knew that the South Vietnamese had 
political problems but believed that Diem could work them out 
eventually. He did not want to involve US forces and tried to 
delay their possible introduction for as long as possible. 
But in not addressing the political problems of the South 
more forcefully, Kennedy only delayed the inevitable 
deployment of US forces in support of the greater objective 
within Southeast Asia: the containment of Communism. In terms 
of responsiveness to the coup, only after senior officials 
had drafted the contentious cable of August 24 did the 
Kennedy Administration take serious action to deal with Diem, 
other than to urge him to change his ways. Immediately after 
the coup was called off on 31 August 1963, the Administration 
tried to formulate a new policy. Each member of the NSC had 
strong views and expressed them, but there was a hesitancy to 
take decisive action. The Kennedy foreign policy organization 
responded quickly to the problem, but the nature of the 
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response tended to be reactive; even after the recognition of 
a problem, Kennedy's advisors were unable to find a solution. 
Finally, alternative courses of action were never 
staffed out because there was no real staff dedicated to this 
purpose. The senior advisors who made up the NSC had become 
their own staff and researched the problems with their first 
hand survey missions. In all their meetings over Vietnam, the 
Kennedy Administration only addressed the problem of how to 
better fight the Communists and not whether the preventing 
the fall of Vietnam was really important to US national 
security. On two occasions the issue of whether the US should 
seriously consider extricating itself from Vietnam was 
brought up for discussion. During the August 31, 1963 NSC 
meeting Paul Kattenburg, a State Department expert on 
Vietnam, suggested that Diem's continued presence would force 
the US out of Vietnam and that it was now an opportunity to 
"get out honorably."87 Kattenburg's idea was dismissed as 
absurd and not an option. During the September 6 meeting of 
the NSC Robert Kennedy made a comment along Kattenburg's line 
of thinking that if no South Vietnamese government could 
fight the Communists, perhaps the US should "get out now, 
permanently and finally."88 There wasn't enough information 
available to answer Robert Kennedy's question and McNamara 
87lbid., 308. 
88Brown,  Prelude to Disaster,   209. 
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suggested sending a mission to Vietnam to find out.89 In both 
instances the idea was not fully explored because it was 
considered antithetical to American strategic objectives for 
Southeast Asia. 
In view of its treatment of the Vietnam dilemma, the 
Kennedy Administration's collegial approach was unsuccessful 
in preventing the eventual escalation and commitment of 
American forces. Kennedy helped to bring the problems upon 
himself when he authorized the changes in the Eisenhower NSC 
without seriously considering its usefulness. The failure of 
the State Department to "take charge" of foreign policy also 
played a major role. The result was a compromised policy - a 
charge the Kennedy team had leveled at Eisenhower During the 
1960 election campaign. In the end Kennedy's Vietnam policy 
was convoluted and contradictory and his organizational 
approach was a contributing factor. Failure in Vietnam was 
not solely due to the collegial approach but more accurately 
a lack of adherence to any formalistic mechanisms. 
89 ibid., 209. 
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IV.CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
"Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent. On 
the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result 
in inefficiency."90 
- Dwight David Eisenhower 
Richard Johnson's framework serves as a point of 
departure for the analysis of Presidential organization. The 
original application of the framework in Managing the White 
House did not fully take into account that Presidents can use 
more than one type of approach; it tended to assume that only 
one particular approach was utilized while others were 
ignored. But Johnson's framework does implicitly suggest 
there is a strong relationship between an Administration's 
organization and the types of policies it can create. This 
thesis has demonstrated, based upon the framework, that a 
direct relationship existed between the manner in which the 
US foreign policy apparatus was structured during the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, and the types of 
policy outputs that were produced. A fundamental change in 
the structure can lead to a change in the types of foreign 
policy the President is able to create. 
90Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change,   1953- 
1956  (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), 87. 
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The alteration in the US foreign policy machinery 
between the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations was a 
major contributing factor to the escalation of American 
involvement in Southeast Asia by 1964. The NSC under 
Eisenhower was the one organization whose responsibility was 
to focus on specific issues as well as to coordinate and 
integrate policy, that could have pointed out the flaws in 
the Kennedy approach to Vietnam. But this structure was 
dismantled because of partisan politics and a desire on the 
part of the President to re-invent/re-invigorate foreign 
policy. This alone would not have been a problem had the 
subsequent foreign policy organization created by the Kennedy 
Administration been able to fill the void left by the NSC. 
Through a combination of mistrust on the part of Kennedy and 
Dean Rusk's personal demeanor, the State Department was 
inadequate to the task of managing foreign policy. Instead 
there was a greater reliance on advisors who advocated 
military solutions rather than diplomatic ones. Whether or 
not Kennedy would have extracted the US from Vietnam after 
the 1964 election is unclear. What is known for sure, and 
examined by this work is that the foreign policy apparatus 
that existed when Lyndon Johnson assumed power was 
unmanageable by him and led to wider escalation of the war. 
This is the major drawback of the collegial system: it 
requires a leader who can manage personalities. Once that 
leader is gone, the organization cannot hope to function 
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optimally. The collegial system then needs support from 
another approach to counter this flaw, and it lies in 
utilizing the formalistic approach. 
As the Eisenhower and Kennedy examples illustrate, there 
are benefits and costs to utilizing each approach. The 
formalistic approach allows for a systematic analysis of an 
issue and for continuity when the decision maker is 
incapacitated or turning over to a successor. But this 
approach generally requires time in order to research an 
issue and develop solutions; it is ill-suited to dealing with 
immediate problems. There is also a danger that if the 
system is not monitored, its processes can screen out and 
distort vital information before it reaches the decision- 
maker . 
The greatest strength of the collegial approach is that 
it can respond quickly to crisis situations. Since this 
approach encourages teamwork among subordinates and minimizes 
conflict, solutions can be determined in short order. 
However, this approach requires a decision maker to be able 
to manage his subordinates in order to keep the group' s 
effort focused upon the issue. This approach also demands a 
great deal of time from the decision maker. 
Given these characteristics, the formalistic and 
collegial approaches are complimentary to one another. One 
provides for systematic analysis, long term planning, and 
integration of governmental policies while the other gives 
77 
the decision maker a device to be utilized for the daily 
problems caused by foreign affairs. The best method for 
managing foreign policy might then be to find a balance 
between the two approaches. 
Both Kennedy and Eisenhower utilized their respective 
approaches as best they could manage. This thesis concludes 
that Dwight D. Eisenhower was better able to find a balance 
between these approaches than John F. Kennedy. The Eisenhower 
Administration tended to be formalistic but also utilized 
collegial mechanisms. The formalistic aspects were 
predominant within the National Security Council, which was 
appropriate given its purpose of policy examination and 
integration. It was the NSC that prompted Eisenhower to 
respond in the instance of Dien Bien Phu by defining 
Indochina as a vital interest to the US. The NSC process not 
only codified US interests in the region, through the 
development of policy papers, but also continually reviewed 
and updated policy. It was this system that came under 
attack by Senator Jackson when his subcommittee pointed out 
all the weaknesses and flaws of such a mechanism. His 
subcommittee's findings played down the advantages of such a 
system, left the general impression that the NSC was the sole 
organization Eisenhower used to manage foreign policy, and 
that this organization was totally inadequate. Jackson seized 
upon this idea when he urged President Kennedy to change the 
NSC system and role. 
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As has been pointed out earlier, the NSC was not the 
only input into Eisenhower's decision making process; there 
was also a great reliance on Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles. Dulles served as the maker of foreign policy in 
accordance with Eisenhower's guidelines. But he was also a 
crisis response mechanism as evidenced by his continual 
travels abroad to meet with foreign leaders; Dulles faced the 
problem first-hand and tried to deal with the issues rather 
than postpone action. The collegial relationship, along with 
the high level of trust and confidence between Eisenhower and 
Dulles, gave the Secretary a great deal of power. A potential 
problem with such a relationship is that the burden of 
evaluating options is placed upon the President and Secretary 
of State. The danger here lies in limiting possible options, 
especially if the Secretary chooses to become an advocate of 
a certain policy. This can be remedied by consulting with 
other advisors in order to obtain more diverse solutions to 
foreign policy problems. Another possible danger is that the 
Secretary could serve as a screen for vital information. The 
President makes decisions based upon the information he 
receives; if the information is poor, the resulting decision 
can be disastrous. Eisenhower was able to deal with these 
shortcomings by developing mechanisms such as the Staff 
Secretary and establishing contacts with other advisors. 
John F. Kennedy was less successful in achieving a 
balance between the two approaches. The impact of the 
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reorganized NSC and the ineffectual State Department on 
Kennedy's policy outputs were tremendous. Kennedy's reliance 
on the collegial approach was not sufficient to manage 
foreign policy because it led to the creation of ad hoc 
policies. Kennedy's initial Vietnam policy in 1961 and all 
subsequent decisions about Vietnam were made based upon the 
advice from his senior advisors. There was never a process to 
reevaluate whether or not American involvement in Southeast 
Asia was essential to achieving overarching US objectives. If 
a serious reassessment had occurred in 1961, the US could 
have taken steps to resolve the problem earlier, rather than 
to wait for the situation to improve. A serious evaluation of 
US purposes in the region could have answered Robert 
Kennedy's question of September 1963: "Could a Communist grab 
be prevented with any Saigon government?"91 A formalistic 
system modeled along Eisenhower's NSC could have conducted 
such an evaluation and eliminated the need for the many 
survey missions Kennedy sent to Vietnam. Such a system would 
have served as another forum for debate; it could have 
provided dissenters a greater voice and added more weight to 
their argument. Stronger arguments against further 
involvement might have swayed Kennedy to choose a more 
decisive long term solution rather than serve his often 
predilection for an immediate fix. 
91Brown, Prelude,   209. 
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A secondary impact of Kennedy's collegial approach was 
an increase in the influence of foreign policy advisors other 
than the Secretary of State. Despite a conspicuous absence 
during the deliberations over US involvement in Southeast 
Asia, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy played an 
important overall role in the Kennedy Administration foreign 
policy organization. After the Bay of Pigs, Bundy moved his 
office from the Old Executive Office Building into the White 
House; and thereby became more accessible to the President. 
As previously mentioned, the reduction of the NSC from the 
previous administration provided the National Security 
Advisor with far greater power. Bundy made contributions to 
the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Cuban Missile Crisis; he 
became a confidant of the President. This rise in stature of 
the National Security Advisor would translate over to Walt 
Rostow, who succeeded Bundy. Rostow was pro-intervention and 
viewed Vietnam as a test of Communist national-liberation war 
theory.92 Up through 1968 he recommended to Lyndon Johnson 
that the US make a greater military commitment to Vietnam. 
Another position that grew in prominence was the 
Secretary of Defense. Robert McNamara was "one of the 
brightest of the Kennedy advisors in sheer intelligence."93 
Since the Secretary of State did not seek to dominate foreign 
92Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of intervention,   (New York: Van Rees 
Press, 1969), 21. 
93 Hoopes, Limits, 21. 
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affairs, McNamara's advice had equal if not more weight with 
the President than Rusk's guidance. In fact the autonomy 
granted to McNamara to run the Defense Department was similar 
to the authority given to Dulles at the State Department in 
the previous Administration; this illustrates the faith 
Kennedy had in McNamara's abilities. If Rusk had been as 
dynamic at the State Department, he could have better 
supported the President's foreign policy decisions. After 
visiting South Vietnam in 1963, McNamara saw the situation 
again rapidly deteriorating after the Diem coup; he 
eventually became committed to keeping the South from falling 
to the Communists. He would also recommend wider US 
intervention to Johnson. The increased importance of the 
National Security Advisor and the Secretary of Defense 
demonstrate the cost of a weak Secretary of State. This 
balancing of powers continues to the present. Although it is 
not detrimental in and of itself to the making of foreign 
policy, the President needs to be aware of this power shift 
and how it impacts upon foreign policy. 
A.ORGANIZING FOREIGN POLICY MECHANISMS 
In understanding the consequences of the formalistic and 
collegial approaches, one can establish an organization that 
incorporates the best qualities of each. The formalistic 
approach should be used to create an organization that 
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systematically analyzes foreign policy issues and develops 
policies, while the collegial approach should be utilized to 
build a mechanism to deal with immediate requirements and 
crises. Therefore a President should develop a two-tiered 
system with each tier dedicated to a specific approach and 
operating in parallel. The lower tier would utilize the 
formalistic approach and support the upper collegial tier. 
The formalistic tier should be a re-organized National 
Security Council modeled similarly to Eisenhower's NSC. Such 
a system was successful in developing policy papers through 
rigorous research and analysis. It maintained a body of 
policy papers that not only provided guidance, but continuity 
between administrations. This tier must integrate policy 
among the various governmental agencies through an inter- 
agency planing committee like the Planning Board. The 
National Security Advisor should resume his role as "honest 
broker" and political confidant to the President, rather than 
serve as a challenger to the Secretary of State. Finally, 
this system must have regularly scheduled meetings so that 
the decision maker can be kept informed and, more 
importantly, forced to directly face foreign policy problems, 
rather than allow them to become long drawn-out affairs. The 
upper tier uses the collegial approach because it is composed 
of the President's closest advisors and needs to be able to 
respond to the immediate needs of foreign policy. This tier 
would be modeled along either the Eisenhower/Dulles 
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relationship or the Kennedy circle of close advisors, 
depending upon the President's leadership style. There should 
be a strong Secretary of State and a vigorous State 
Department. The Secretary of State does not necessarily need 
to dominate the other agencies; it does need to be aggressive 
in exerting its influence upon the foreign affairs of the 
United States. A weak State Department will allow the 
National Security Advisor and Secretary of Defense greater 
influence and possibly skew policy towards options that rely 
less on diplomatic solutions. As noted earlier the President 
needs to be made aware of the dynamics and costs that 
surround each approach. 
Today a President cannot afford to start learning how to 
manage foreign policy once he takes power. He only has three 
years in office to carry out his foreign policy goals; the 
fourth year tends to be dedicated towards a re-election 
campaign and seldom yields bold and dramatic policies, even 
if a foreign crisis calls for action. In the last thirty 
years there has only been one full-term Presidency - the 
Reagan Administration. A two-term President is one who is 
able to develop, implement and achieve results with his 
policies. During the last three decades there has been a 
shift in power away from the Executive Branch towards the 
Legislative Branch which has tried to assert its influence 
over foreign affairs. The Congress cannot possibly manage 
foreign policy because of its diversity. Therefore foreign 
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policy must emanate from the President. The dynamics of the 
Presidency make great demands upon the President's time and 
attention. A focus primarily on domestic concerns while 
ignoring foreign problems, in hopes they will work themselves 
out, can hurt US national security in the long run. Vietnam 
started off as a small problem that was placed on the back 
burner rather than dealt with in a frank manner. The entire 
tragedy could have been avoided if the Kennedy Administration 
had faced the issue squarely and created realistic solutions 
instead of waiting for the situation to take care of itself. 
Foreign policy is an ongoing process that requires both 
continual attention and flexibility to respond to 
uncertainty. Utilizing the formalistic and collegial 
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